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Abstract
We study the interplay between the central bank transparency, its credibility, and
the in￿ation target level. Based on a model developed in the spirit of the global
games literature, we argue that whenever a weak central bank adopts a high degree
of transparency and a low target level, a bad and self con￿rmed type of equilibrium
may arise. In this case, an over-the-target in￿ation becomes more likely. The cen-
tral bank is considered weak when favorable state of nature is required for the target
to be achieved. On the other hand, if a weak central bank opts for less ambitious
goals, namely lower degree of transparency and higher target level, it may avoid
con￿dence crises and ensure a unique equilibrium for the expected in￿ation. More-
over, even after ruling out the possibility of con￿dence crises, less ambitious goals
may be desirable in order to attain higher credibility and hence a better coordination
of expectations. Conversely, a low target level and a high central bank transparency
are desirable whenever the economy has strong fundamentals and the target can be
ful￿lled in many states of nature.
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31 Introduction
Should central bank transparency go too far? How low the in￿ation target should be?
We discuss such questions based on a model developed in the spirit of the global games
literature. We conclude that a low target level and a high central bank transparency are
desirable whenever the economy has strong fundamentals and the target can be ful￿lled
in many states of nature. On the other hand, if the central bank lacks credibility1, a higher
target level and a lower degree of transparency is a better option.
Conclusionsareexplicitinsomenumericalexercises, inwhichthecentralbankchooses
the target level of in￿ation and its level of transparency. If the actual central bank’s choice
is not well grounded, and does not consider the limitations imposed by the fundamentals
and the credibility level, we say that a too ambitious framework is being adopted. In this
case, con￿dence crises2 may arise. Therefore, to manage an adequate in￿ation targeting
regime, the trade-off between the ambitious framework and a more defensible one should
be considered. Moreover, even when the economy is not subject to con￿dence crises,
less ambition may be required in order to attain a higher credibility and hence a better
coordination of expectations.
We start with the common uncertainty model, in which the uncertainty faced by the
central bank is the same as the one faced by the private sector. The common doubt is about
the future central bank’s incentive in achieving the target. Based on this ￿rst approach,
we conclude that a higher target for in￿ation increases the credibility in the precommit-
ment stage, making the optimal target higher than the one obtained when this increasing
credibility effect is not considered, as in the Cukierman-Liviatan model [5].
Second, extending the common uncertainty model to encompass con￿dence crises, we
1Credibility is the extent to which agents believe that the central bank will carry out its pre-announced
plan (the in￿ation target).
2By con￿dence crises we mean a new equilibrium of the self-ful￿lling type where over-the-target in￿a-
tion emerges in some states of nature.
4￿nd three self-con￿rmed type of equilibrium for the expected in￿ation: the target level,
the discretionary level, and an in￿ation rate that is lower than the discretionary one, but
higher than the target. These equilibria are named as optimistic, pessimistic and not-
extreme, respectively. Once in the multiplicity region, as the target level becomes higher,
the not-extreme equilibrium converges to the pessimistic one, not encouraging higher
targets. On the other hand, if the target becomes high enough, multiple equilibria can be
avoided and the optimistic one is ensured. The previous increasing credibility effect does
not necessarily hold. The optimal target depends on the likelihood of each equilibrium to
be selected and on the central bank’s willingness to avoid con￿dence crises.
Third, we consider the no common uncertainty model. Again, the uncertainty is re-
lated to the future central bank’s incentive in achieving the target. Once disclosed, in-
centive strength is denoted by the term commitment-strength. Therefore, the higher the
commitment-strength is, the stronger the incentive disclosed. No-common feature comes
fromthefactthatthecentralbankandthepubliccomputethesameexpectedcommitment-
strength, but the public perceive a wider range for its realization. Our assumption is that
the difference in ranges is decreasing in the degree of the central bank transparency. In
addition, if the central bank was fully transparent, the range difference would be zero and
the uncertainty would be common. Results indicate that not only higher targets but also
less transparency may help central bank to rule out con￿dence crises.
Finally, weextendthenocommonuncertaintymodelbyperturbingcommon-knowledge
not only between public and private sector, but also between private agents. Then, unique-
ness can be ensured, even when speculative attacks are considered, as in Morris-Shin[6].
The ￿rst result is also recovered, i.e. a higher target for in￿ation increases the credibil-
ity in the precommitment stage. By contrast, in the presence of a precise public signal,
the equilibrium multiplicity may still exist for a small lack of common knowledge, as in
Angeletos and Werning[1]. In such a case, as the target level becomes higher, the not-
extreme equilibrium converges to the pessimistic one. On the other hand, if the target
5becomes high enough, multiple (bad) equilibria is avoided. Once again, the increasing
credibility effect does not necessarily hold. The optimal target depends on the likelihood
of each equilibrium to be selected over the multiplicity region as well as on the central
bank’s willingness to avoid a con￿dence crisis. Results also indicate that more precise
public information may open the door to bad equilibrium, contrary to the conventional
wisdom that more central bank transparency is always good when an in￿ation targeting
regime is considered.
The aim of this last model is to provide a complete framework to study alternative
central bank policies when the in￿ation targeting regime is considered. By complete,
we mean a framework that encompasses both the recent debate about the information
structure of the economies and its implications for the equilibrium multiplicity, as well
as some classical features already discussed and understood in the rules versus discretion
literature.
2 Common Uncertainty Model with
Endogenous Credibility
Our basic model follows Cukierman-Liviatan [5] which follows Barro and Gordon [2].
The Cukierman-Liviatan model appraises the uncertainty about the commitment enforce-
ment and the conclusion is that the optimal target should be decreasing in the central bank
credibility. This is an expected result, but it is derived considering a naive uncertainty
approach, based on two central bank types: the ￿strong￿ one which always adheres to the
announced policy and the ￿weak￿ one which does it only as an ex-post expedient. More-
over, the transparency issue cannot be totally addressed since each private agent has the
same information set.
Then, we will gradually propose some extensions. First, the ful￿llment of the target
6may depend not on the central bank type, but on the intensity of a shock observed after the
target announcement. Second, the commitment strength may also depend on the credibil-
ity, since the credibility itself should affect the central bank’s decision about respecting
(or not) the commitment. Finally, asymmetric uncertainty and the public strategic behav-
ior should be considered. Next, we describe the Cukierman-Liviatan original model and
further extend it to address the previous comments.
2.1 Agents and Timing Actions
There are two types of agents: the central bank and the private agent. Actions are taken
in three stages: the central bank announces the target for in￿ation ￿a, expectations ￿e
are formed by the public and actual in￿ation is chosen ￿. There are two central bank
(sub)typesi 2 f1;2gwithdifferentabilitiestoprecommit. Thestrongtype(i = 1)always
ful￿lls its commitment while the weak one (i = 2) does it only if it is ex post expedient.
2.2 Central Bank Type
The objective function for the central bank of type i is positively related to surprise in￿a-


















A > 0; ￿a ￿ 0; and ￿e ￿ 0
Weaddthecostofnotful￿llingthetargetfunctionci(￿a;￿)totheoriginalCukierman-
Liviatan model [5] to formalize that the strong type always ful￿lls the pre-announced
target while the weak type is not concerned about the previous announcement.
7Note that the central bank best response for actual in￿ation ￿￿ is either the target level
￿a pre-announced or the discretionary in￿ation level A. Let wi
a be the welfare gain of

















, and it is easy to check that (w1
a > 0) and (w2
a ￿ 0) for any ￿a 2 [0;A]: Both types of
ability are justi￿ed for any possible target level, since one of the goals of the in￿ation
targeting regime is to coordinate expectations from the discretionary in￿ation level A to
socially optimal level 0:
2.3 Private Agent Type
Thereisacontinuumofprivateagentswithoutastrategicbehavior. Theirroleistoprocess
information, to form beliefs concerning the central bank’s type and to compute the ex-
pected in￿ation. It is assumed that the private expectation about the central bank type
is formed based on the exogenous probability ￿ of the type being strong (i = 1): This
probability measures the central bank’s credibility. The expected in￿ation is given by:
E [￿j￿;￿a] = ￿e = ￿￿a + (1 ￿ ￿)A
2.4 Result with Exogenous Credibility
Based on this framework, Cukierman and Liviatan [5] answered the following question:
￿what should be the optimal announcement ￿￿
a for each type i?￿. For (￿ = 1); the target
and the expected in￿ation are the same. Then, the central bank type 1 promises and
8delivers zero in￿ation rate. If we consider ￿ 2 (0;1); the central bank type 1 promises
and delivers A(1 ￿ ￿) in￿ation rate: As ￿ tends to zero the announcement effect on the
expectations vanishes and the central bank type 1; who always keeps its promises, tends
to pre announce the discretionary rate of in￿ation. Although type 2 ends up in￿ating at the
discretionary rate, it has an interest to keep itself indistinguishable at the announcement
stage in order to stimulate lower expectations: (￿e < A): It follows that ￿￿i
a = A(1 ￿
￿) for both types i. Accordingly, full credibility (￿ = 1) is not required for in￿ation
targeting to be implemented. In the absence of precommitment, the result leads to an
in￿ationary bias A that can be reduced whenever central banks are able to precommit
with some credibility (￿ > 0): This bias reduction improves welfare. To totally eliminate
the in￿ationary bias and to achieve the socially optimal in￿ation rate (zero), the ability to
commit must not be only present but must also be undoubtedly recognized by the public.
Otherwise, a lower in￿ationary bias reappears.
Next, we gradually extend this framework to argue that there are some other factors
affecting the choice of the in￿ation target level.
2.5 Endogenous Credibility
Considering the endogenous credibility, we now compute not only the effect of the credi-
bility on the target, but also the effect of the target choice on the credibility. It is important
to consider this effect since less ambitious (higher) targets are attained more often than
closer to the zero target, whenever the monetary policy is subordinated to ￿scal ￿nancing
requirements that can make more in￿ation tolerable during crisis times.
Therefore, we make the uncertainty about the commitment-strength coming not from
some private suspicion related to the central bank type. There may be shocks that affect
the cost of being above the target implying that the central bank also faces uncertainty
about the future in￿ation.
9The three-stage-model considered here is the same as the previous one, but with only
one type of central bank, characterized by the cost function c(￿a;￿); which is common
knowledge. Instead of being a real number, the cost of not ful￿lling the target k follows




: It is drawn after the public’s expectations
have been formed but before the choice of the actual in￿ation. A low realization of k can
be viewed as a shock that decreases the value of keeping the commitment without using




or (K = A2) the equilibrium can be
computed as follows: with (￿￿ = 0) and discretionary in￿ation rate, or with (￿￿ = 1)
and zero in￿ation rate, respectively. To keep attention on the intermediate case, where
￿￿ 2 (0;1); we assume that K = 0 and K = B > 0: Whether the commitment is
delivered or not depends on the values of k and ￿a. The credibility ￿ is given by:

















When choosing the target, the central bank understands that the higher is its level, the
more credible its policy tends to be. In particular, only the A-in￿ation commitment is
fully credible.
As in the previous model, because of the possibility of the cost of not ful￿lling the
target being positive, the commitment is listened by the public. Thus, commitment drives
expectations and adds value to the economy. But now we have a different answer to what
should be the optimal target ￿￿
a. On the one hand, for a given ￿; the closer to zero is
the target announcement, the lower the expected in￿ation is, since ￿a drives it. This fact
increases welfare. But, on the other hand, the closer to zero is the target announcement,





Proposition 1 For any economy ￿ (A;B), the equilibrium target ￿￿
a exists, it is unique,
and it is in the interior of the set [0;A]. If we use the endogenous credibility ￿(￿￿
a(A;B))
obtained and the same A; the solution to the original Cukierman-Liviatan model is a new
optimal target ￿￿￿
a (A;￿); always lower than ￿￿
a(A;B): Proof: Appendix.
Note that, for any ￿xed ￿a, as B goes to in￿nite, ￿ goes to one. As B goes to zero, ￿
goes to zero too. Because of the increasing credibility effect from higher targets, ￿(￿￿
a)
is bounded below by some positive value.
A less ambitious target improves credibility in the announcement and induces posi-
tive welfare effect for economies where the central bank is not able to set ￿fully-credible￿
commitment. Then, when setting targets, the central bank must be aware not only that the
announcement effect on expectations is reduced by credibility but also that the announce-
ment itself affects credibility. We present in the Figure 1 the optimal target announced
when considering the credibility effect versus the one announced when this effect is ne-
glected. Note that, the weaker is the ability in precommitment (lesser B), the higher the
difference between the two announcement values is. On the other hand, as B increases,





One possible reason to assume some cost for not ful￿lling the target comes from the fact
that the public may learn from the central bank’s decisions. In this sense, credibility loss
is a punishment for abandoning the target. Then, credibility ￿ may affect the central
bank’s incentive in defending the target. Moreover, the value of respecting the target
should be increasing in the current credibility whenever the bene￿ts from ￿keeping the
11target decisions￿ are computed in a much slower way than the credibility loss associated
with ￿not keeping the target decisions￿. This feature opens the door for con￿dence crises
and self-con￿rmed in￿ations.
Keeping the three-stage framework, the economy ￿
sci with self-con￿rmed in￿ation is
nowde￿nedby: fA;￿a;￿;n;h(:)g;withA > 0;￿a 2 [0;A];￿ ￿ 0;n 2 R;andhde￿ned
as an increasing function that maps the credibility ￿ 2 [0;1] into a real number h(￿). In
order to reach a simple characterization of the equilibrium, we also assume that h is a
linear function. All of them are common knowledge. The central bank type is unique




; but now, to be more general, we set K = (n ￿ ￿) and
K = n: The objective function for the central bank is the same as the one considered







where k is a random variable distributed according to U [n ￿ ￿;n]; ￿￿ is the endogenous
credibility that solves ￿ = prob(￿ = ￿aj￿), and the function h measures how much the
cost of not keeping the target depends on the public expectations. The timing of actions
is also the same: a target ￿a is announced, expectations ￿￿ are formed, the uncertainty k
is solved and the actual in￿ation ￿ is implemented.
With such assumptions, both fundamental and expectations shocks are important to
compute the central bank’s incentives in choosing the actual in￿ation. The welfare gain
wa from keeping the target can be written as follows:
wa(k;￿) = k ￿ x(￿a) + h(￿)












12It is always possible to reach an equilibrium ￿￿ for any economy ￿
sci and it may be
possible to reach more than one. When the uncertainty about the future central bank’s in-
centives is high, i.e. ￿ > h(1)￿h(0); we classify the economy ￿
sci as a ￿
u-type economy;
otherwise, we classify the economy as ￿
m-type: The following proposition characterizes
the equilibrium:
Proposition 2 The economy ￿
sci always admits an equilibrium. For a ￿
u type economy
there are three types of unique-￿￿-equilibrium, depending on the target level ￿a:
[￿￿ = 1] ￿ perfect commitment , x(￿a) ￿ (n ￿ ￿ + h(1))
[￿￿ 2 (0;1)] ￿ imperfect commitment , x(￿a) 2 (n ￿ ￿ + h(1);n + h(0))
[￿￿ = 0] ￿ discretionary ￿commitment￿ , x(￿a) ￿ n + h(0)
; for (￿
m) type economy it is possible that:
x(￿a) ￿ (n ￿ ￿ + h(1)) and perfect commitment is possible
x(￿a) 2 (n + h(0);n ￿ ￿ + h(1)) and any commitment-type is possible
x(￿a) ￿ n + h(0) and discretionary ￿commitment￿ is possible.
Proof: Appendix.
According to this proposition, if there is too much uncertainty concerning future cen-
tral bank’s incentives, ￿ > h(1) ￿ h(0); then the equilibrium is unique: perfect com-
mitment for very strong central bank (high n), discretionary for very weak central bank
and imperfect commitment otherwise. When ￿ is suf￿ciently large, there is no room for
self-con￿rmed in￿ation.
On the other hand, if the region for the possible central bank’s incentives shrinks
(￿ decreases), the uniqueness remains only for a very strong or for a very weak central
bank. The intuition is that some economies may be subject to multiple equilibria when the
13decision about respecting the target or not depends much on the credibility (￿) before the
realization of k. In such a case, increasing the target for in￿ation may have two welfare
effects. First, and the new one, it is possible that only perfect commitment equilibrium
remains: Second, as long as h0(:) > ￿; the critical k￿4 becomes greater when the target is
increased, and hence the state region for good expectations (￿ = ￿a) shrinks. Then, the
central bank credibility may be increasing in the target or not, whenever ￿ < h(1)￿h(0).
As we have shown in the Figure 2, when h(￿) ￿ ￿￿ and multiple equilibria are pos-
sible, increasing the target may be a good deal if it avoids multiplicity. But this decision
also depends on the central bank’s willingness to avoid a con￿dence crisis and on the
probability of each equilibrium to be selected over the multiple equilibria region. Coor-
dination failure allows all possible equilibria to occur. Such dif￿culty is usually solved
by the de￿nition of an arbitrary sunspot variable in order to compute expected welfare
for each policy choice5. Obviously, the policy recommendations varies accordingly to the
assumptions about the sunspot distribution, so we avoid an equilibrium selection theory.
Instead, the expected welfare for each equilibrium versus policy variables are plotted on
the same ￿gure. In this way, the reader can conclude by himself the best option for some
policymaker, as a ‘max-min’ type, for example.
Besides increasing the target level, an alternative public policy to rule out con￿dence
crises may be related to the availability of the public information. In the numerical exer-
cise presented in the Figure 3, we consider that the central bank can add some noise ￿ to
theprivateinformation, bybeinglesstransparent. Inthiscase, thek-distributionperceived
by the central bank is uniformly distributed on [n ￿ ￿;n]; but the k-distribution perceived
by the public is uniformly distributed on [n ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿;n + ￿]; with (￿ ￿ 0): Results show
that less transparency may avoid con￿dence crises when the target level considered is
equal to 3%.





5See Cole and Kehoe [4] for coordination failure in the public debt market.
143 No-Common Uncertainty Model
In this section, to appraise the information issue in a more sophisticated way, we consider
the public as a set formed by different private agents. Up to this point, each private
agent’s role has been to process the same information, to form the same beliefs concerning
the central bank’s incentives and to compute an unique in￿ationary expectations. By
adding strategy options (to attack or not the target) and a payoff structure to them, and
assuming an asymmetric information structure, a coordination motive may arise from
some strategic complementarity in their actions. Moreover, since the attack-mass will
depend on the endogenous credibility de￿ned by prob(￿ = ￿ajpublic information), this
model also provides one possible interpretation for the function h(:).
The new economy ￿
ai with an asymmetric information structure is de￿ned as a one-
shotgamewithtwostages, andtwoagenttypescharacterizedby: fA; ￿a;￿;h(:);k; c; ￿; ￿pg
with A > 0;￿a 2 [0;A]; ￿ > 0;h(￿) ￿ ￿￿;k 2 R; c 2 (0;1); ￿ > 0; ￿p > 0: ￿ and ￿p
de￿ne the information structure and c de￿nes the payoff structure, both of them related
to each private agent. fA;￿a;￿;h(:);kg de￿ne the central bank type. In the last stage of
the game the central bank chooses the actual in￿ation ￿; after observing the speculative
actions (1 ￿ ￿); which is taken in the ￿rst stage.
3.1 Private Agent Type
The population of private agents (speculators) is continuous and normalized to unit. Each
speculator j may set ￿j equal to one or zero. If she sets ￿j equal to zero she believes
that the target will probably6 not be reached. With some cost, she speculates based on her
beliefs (buying foreign currency, for example). If she sets ￿j equal to one she believes
that the target will probably be reached. In this case, she does not bet against the central
bank (keeping savings denominated in local currency, for example). Then, the size of the
6In equilibrium, with probability higher than (c):
15attack (1 ￿ ￿) is given by (1 ￿ prob(￿j = 1)): Each j payoff is de￿ned as being equal
to (1 ￿ ￿j)(gs ￿ c): The speculative gain gs depends on the central bank’s response. If
the target is sustained, then gs = ga; otherwise gs = gA; where (gA > c > ga): With
this payoff structure, to speculate is a good deal only when the target is abandoned, since
(gA ￿ c > 0); and (ga ￿ c < 0): To keep our framework as close as possible to the one
proposed in Angeletos and Werning [1], we de￿ne gA ￿ 1; and ga ￿ 0; and we also con-
sider that the strength of the status-quo k is not common knowledge. Instead of observing
the realization of the k-value, each player j observes the public signal sp and the private
signal sj,
s
j = k + ￿"j ; ￿ > 0 and "j ~N(0;1)
s
p = k + ￿p"p ; ￿p > 0 and "p ~N(0;1); where:
"j is assumed to be independent of k and "j0 for all j0 6= j. "p is also assumed to be
independent of k and "j.
3.2 Central Bank Type
Theobjectivefunctionforthecentralbankisthesameastheoneconsideredinthesecond-
proposition model. Then, central bank keeps the in￿ation equal to the target ￿a if and only
if (wa ￿ 0) 7: Otherwise it in￿atesat level A: k is drawn inthe beginning of the gamefrom
the support of the improper uniform, de￿ned over the entire real line, but its value is not
observed directly by the public (speculators) as previous explained.
Since the target tends to be abandoned during intense attacks, the incentive to attack
is increasing in the size of the attack . Note also that, the greater is the size of the attack,
the lower the endogenous credibility is.






2 : The no-attack-mass de￿ned by
(￿) is increasing in the aggregate credibility, which is de￿ned by prob(￿ = ￿ajpublic information):
163.3 The Equilibrium
Results are based on monotone equilibria de￿ned as perfect Bayesian. For each public
signal, the agent j attacks if and only if her private signal sj is less than some threshold






s￿ (sp;￿a) ￿ k
￿
) = 1 ￿ ￿
where ￿(:) denotes the cumulative distribution function for the standard normal. The
central bank sustains the target if and only if k is greater than k￿, which is given by:
k
￿(s
p;￿a) = x(￿a) + ￿:￿(
s￿ (sp;￿a) ￿ k￿(sp;￿a)
￿
) ￿ ￿
The expected payoff from attacking must be equal to zero whenever sj = s￿ (sp;￿a)8,
which implies the following indifference condition:
p
￿:￿































￿1 (1 ￿ c)
It is always possible to ￿nd at least one k￿ 2 [x ￿ ￿;x] that solves the previous equation.






According to Angeletos-Werning [1], for any (positive) doubt related to the public sig-
nal ￿p, uniqueness is ensured by a suf￿ciently small (positive) doubt related to the private
signal ￿: Moreover, multiplicity may vanish when the common knowledge is perturbed,
as in Morris and Shin [6]. This result always holds for some exogenous information








17structure because precise private information anchors individual behavior and makes it
dif￿cult to predict the actions of others. Under the reasonable assumption that the im-
provement in the private signal implies improvement in the public signal, it is possible
that public information becomes more precise faster than the private one, and so multi-
plicity may still exist even for small common knowledge perturbation (￿ ! 0). In this
















Proposition 3 For ￿
u type economy, a higher target increases the commitment credibility.
For ￿
m type economy, a higher target may turn the commitment more credible or not. The
effect on the credibility will depend on the likelihood of each equilibrium k￿(sp) to be
selected. Proof: Appendix.
When the target is increased, two effects are observed. First, the shock required for
the commitment to be abandoned becomes greater (smaller k￿realization), for any ￿xed
￿ 2 (0;1). This fact inhibits attacks and adds credibility. Second, as the central bank sets
a higher target for in￿ation, new attack-strategies (or beliefs) are settled and this fact may
increase the attack mass (decrease the credibility) because ￿￿ (￿a) may be decreasing in
￿a. In this case, a higher target gives more room for over-the-target in￿ation. The ￿rst
effect is always preponderant for a ￿
u type economy.
For the ￿
m type economy, the ￿rst effect tends to be preponderant when the extreme
equilibria are selected ( the k￿(sp) closest to x (or to x ￿ ￿) ). Note that, when strate-
gies are too optimistic or too pessimistic, the size of an attack is closer to zero or to
one, respectively. For more pondered strategies, based on the not-extreme equilibrium
k￿(sp); the attack-mass and the no-attack-mass are both signi￿cant. Then, enlargement
in the attack size induced by more aggressive strategies is more relevant and the critical
18k becomes greater for higher targets (see Figure 4). When the not-extreme equilibrium
tends to be selected, relaxing the target in order to attain more credibility is a good idea
only if multiplicity is avoided in many states sp. Otherwise, the speculative movement
could be strengthened and the commitment enforcement, reduced. In the Figure 5 we
show extreme k-equilibria as a function of the public signal realization sp. The para-
meters used are the same as those used in the Figure 4 and the target level considered
in the benchmark case is equal to 2%. Note that, either in the benchmark case with
a higher target level (benchmark parameters except for ￿a = 12%) or in the benchmark
case with a lower transparency level (benchmark parameters except for ￿p = 35%); mul-
tiplicity vanishes in our numerical approximation. On the other hand, when the target is
increased from 2% to 6.5%, multiplicity can be noted9.
3.4 Central Bank Transparency and Welfare Analysis
A lower ￿p value may be viewed as more central bank transparency. According to our
results, more precise public information may open the door to bad equilibrium, contrary
to the conventional wisdom that more transparency is always good in an in￿ation targeting
framework. Some other papers have argued in the same direction, but based on different
models. In Metz [3], more precise public information increases the likelihood of currency
crises in case of bad fundamentals. Morris and Shin ( [7] and [8] ) have pointed out that
welfare effect of increased public disclosures is ambiguous and that there is a dilemma
between managing market prices and learning from market prices. They also conclude
that when a Central Bank cannot actually control in￿ation10, the in￿ation targeting regime
could fail and undermine credibility. In this sense, it would be better for the central bank
tosimplyforecastin￿ationandpointouttheextenttowhichitsforecastsarecontingenton
9For suf￿ciently high target, theoretical multiplicity becomes negligible. In this case, to increase the
target up to 6.5% is not suf￿cient.
10Sargent and Wallace [9] is a good reference for the limitations of the central bank’s control over
in￿ation:
19￿scal policy. Our results suggest that in￿ation targeting may be a good set-up whenever
the central bank can actually control some level of in￿ation in some states of nature.
In the Figure 6 we present the combined welfare effect of a higher target and less
transparency, considering that the central bank knows its commitment strength in the
beginning of the game, which is given by (ko = 3%). Note that, for any given k and





















k + ￿ ￿ (￿￿ (sp)) ; ￿ 6= ￿a
0 ; otherwise.
and the aggregated uncertainty is given by sp: We plot in the vertical axis the expected
welfare cost for in￿ation only for the extreme equilibria cases. We can observe that,
as the central bank becomes less transparent, the welfare associated with the optimistic
equilibrium is reduced, while the welfare associated with the pessimistic equilibrium is
increased. Results also indicate that less transparency may be welfare improving out of
the multiplicity region. For a lower target level, 2%, this welfare effect is present over a
wider ￿unique-equilibrium-region￿, but on the other hand, it is ￿atter than the equivalent
effect observed under a higher in￿ation target level, 6.5%. Finally, for ￿p = 0:19; we
verify that multiplicity is ruled out from the numerical approximation when the target is
increased from 2% to 6.5%.
In the Figure 7, we replicate the result from the Figure 6, but considering a very strong
central bank (ko = 30). In this case, uniqueness is ensured and we can say that a higher
transparency increases the expected welfare, contrary to the result just presented for a
weak central bank (ko = 3%).
204 Concluding Remarks
We ￿rst appraise how the target level of in￿ation should be set in the presence of un-
certainty about the ability in precommiting. Ruling out con￿dence crises and imperfect
information, we conclude that higher target for in￿ation increases the credibility in the
precommitment stage.
Second, adding the possibility of con￿dence crises under perfect information, we con-
clude that to set a higher target for in￿ation may stimulate over-the-target in￿ation and
reduce the central bank credibility. On the other hand, multiple bad equilibria may be
avoided. The optimal target will depend on the likelihood of each equilibrium to be se-
lected and on the central bank’s willingness to avoid con￿dence crises.
Third, we rule out con￿dence crises again, but now by breaking common knowledge
with exogenous and imperfect information structure, as in Morris and Shin [6]. In this
case, it is possible to conclude that a higher target for in￿ation increases the credibility in
the precommitment stage.
Finally, in the presence of a precise public signal, con￿dence crises may still exist
even for a small lack of common knowledge, as in Angeletos and Werning ([1]). In this
case, precise public information may open the door to bad equilibrium. Once again, in the
multiple equilibria case, to set higher targets for in￿ation may stimulate over-the-target
in￿ation and reduce the central bank credibility.
Therefore, results can be resumed as follows: depending on the perception of the
target-strength uncertainty, it may be optimal to have an ideal status-quo (low target un-
der high transparency) or a more defensible one (higher target and less central bank trans-
parency). The optimal policy will also depend on the central bank’s willingness to avoid
con￿dence crises.
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Figure 1: Optimal Targets
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Figure 2: Self-Con￿rmed Equilibria (A = 15% ; ￿ = 2.5%)
23η = 0
η = 2B
ρ = .15% ; A= 5% ; n= ε = B =.1% for both figures.
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ρ = .15% ; A= 5% ; n= ε = B =.1% for both figures.
Figure 3: Multiplicity and Transparency
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Figure 4: No-Common Knowledge K￿-Equilibrium
(sp = 0; A = :5; ￿
￿p = :60
:18; c = :5; ￿ = :2)
























Figure 5: Extremes K￿-Equilibrium as function of sp
Vertical axis: Critical k￿. Horizontal axis: Public signal (sp)
(Figure4’s parameters are considered, ￿a=.02 for the benchmark case)



































Figure 6: Welfare Cost in the Extreme Equilibria and Transparency
Vertical axis: In￿ation welfare expected cost. Horizontal axis: Standard deviation of the public signal
(The Figure4’s parameters are considered )













































Figure 7: Welfare Cost in the Extreme Equilibria and Transparency for strong economy (ko = 30)
(Again, The Figure4’s parameters are considered )
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a = arg max
￿a￿[0;A]
E [v (￿a;k)]; k ~U [0;B]
v (￿a;k) = max
￿￿0
￿








and it is easy to check that,










































































































2 ￿ A3 = v (0) < u(0) = AB
2
￿
;[AB = v (A) > u(A) = 0] and [u0(:) < 0;and
29v0(:) > 08(￿a ￿ A)], thentheequilibrium￿￿
a 2 (0;A) existsandisuniqueforany(A > 0;B > 0):
Now, de￿ning D(￿￿
a) ￿ ￿￿
a ￿ A(1 ￿ ￿(￿￿






a ￿ A3 ￿ A(￿￿
a)
2￿
.D(.)ispositivefor￿a = A and negative for
￿a = 0: Next we will show that D(￿￿
a) is always positive, since ￿￿
a is bounded below
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(3A2+2B) : Since D(￿￿
















Now, if we set ￿a = A3


























; we conclude that ￿￿
a ￿ A(1 ￿ ￿(￿￿
a)) for any
(A > 0;B > 0):
Proof. of proposition 2: The target is ful￿lled whenever wa = k + h(￿) ￿ x ￿ 0;
with x(￿a) ￿
h






. The region for which the target (￿a) may induce
multiple equilibria expectations is given by the interval [Kd;Ku], where:
K
u(￿a;￿) = inf fk 2 Rj(￿x + k + h(￿)) ￿ 0g = x(￿a) ￿ h(￿)
K


















u] \ [n ￿ ￿;n] 6= ￿
￿ = ￿ = 0 if K
d > n
￿ = ￿ = 1 if K
u < n ￿ ￿
Thereare￿vepossiblecasesforthe￿[Kd;Ku]-position￿relatedtothesupport[n ￿ ￿;n],
as follows:
30Case Exist , Kd Ku Equilibrium
1 x 2 [n + h(0);n ￿ ￿ + h(1)] 2 [n ￿ ￿;n] and Ku = Kd ￿ 2 [0;1]
2 x 2 [n + h(0);n ￿ ￿ + h(1)] 2 [n ￿ ￿;n] > n ￿ 2 [0;1]
3 x 2 [n + h(0);n ￿ ￿ + h(1)] < n ￿ ￿ 2 [n ￿ ￿;n] ￿ 2 [0;1]
4 n ￿ ￿ + h(1) > x Ku < n ￿ ￿ ￿ = 1
5 n + h(0) < x Kd > n ￿ = 0
;
considering (h(1) ￿ h(0) ￿ ￿): Otherwise, cases 2 and 3 do not exist and for cases 1,
4and5wesetx 2 [n ￿ ￿ + h(1);n + h(0)]insteadofsettingx 2 [n + h(0);n ￿ ￿ + h(1)].














p [k￿] = ￿ ￿
￿2
psp + ￿￿1 (1 ￿ c) ￿ p
￿ we conclude that ￿(:;x) is increas-





2￿: Reduction in x must be compensated by reduction




psp + ￿￿1 (1 ￿ c) ￿ p
￿ = ￿(k￿;x)
i
valid. The region over the
e k￿support where the target is ful￿lled increases for all (sp) and the size of attack de-
creases as s￿(sp) decreases.







2￿: In this case, reduction in x must be compensated by an increasing in k
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; and an increase in the size of attack.
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